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THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN ACTION
MICHAEL A. BELLESILES*
INTRODUCTION
What follows may be entirely irrelevant. There are those who
argue that historical inquiry offers nothing to our understanding of
the Second Amendment. This postmodernist position is well
represented by Charlton Heston, who has dismissed historical
scholarship as not in the least bit relevant and called for historians to
stop wasting their time in the archives.1 Akhil Amar recently stated
that current understandings of the original meaning of the Second
Amendment "might be false as a matter of historical fact but [are]
nonetheless true as a matter of constitutional law."' 2 William Van
Alstyne insists that historical research into the context of the Second
Amendment "doesn't seem to me to make a very great deal of
difference against the background of Bunker Hill, and the
minutemen, and the imagery that this is the nature of things."3
Postmodernism denies the value and even the validity of historical
context, emphasizing instead language and image; truth itself is a
rhetorical social construct, it is the critic's representation of the past
that matters. The adversarial approach to the past, such as is
demonstrated by the self-proclaimed "standard model" of the Second
Amendment,4 usually takes a nonhistorical perspective, preferring to
hunt for supportive quotations while subjecting well-known
statements to excruciating linguistic deconstruction rather than
* Associate Professor of History, Emory University. Professor Bellesiles has also taught
at Oxford and Stanford Universities.
1. See Charlton Heston, Rewriting Firearms-and Freedom-Out of History, GUNS &
AMMo, Nov. 1999, at 37, 37-38.
2. Chris Mooney, Showdown: Liberal Legal Scholars Are Supporting the Right to Bear
Arms; But Will Historians Shoot Them Down?, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 2000, at 26, 32 (quoting
Akhil Amar).
3. Id. (quoting William Van Alstyne).
4. The "standard model" asserts that the Second Amendment protects both an individual
and a collective right of the people to bear arms. The standard model was initially proposed in
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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undertaking the hard and time-consuming task of archival research.5
Another feature of postmodern scholarship that is evident in the
supposed standard model is an assertion of an intellectual monopoly.
Thus Don Kates and Randy Barnett declare "virtual unanimity"
among scholars "that there is no tenable textual or historical
argument against a broad individual right view of the Second
Amendment, '6 and Joyce Lee Malcolm insists "there is no one for me
to argue against anymore."'7 They proclaim themselves victorious in a
match without competitors.
The postmodernist perspective is, of course, blasphemy to a
historian. When people say that facts do not matter or exist we tend
to lose our sense of humor, look very stern, and warn that the next
stop is Holocaust denial. However, this Article is not concerned with
the recent debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment,
which has been well and hotly discussed elsewhere. 8 This Article is
concerned with capturing the social, legal, and military context of the
Second Amendment. The continuing efforts of states to control
access to and use of guns once the Second Amendment was part of
the Constitution seemingly indicate a lack of concern for an
individual right to own a gun. The absence of notable opposition to
such state action, even when it extended to disarming a portion of the
population, speaks to popular attitudes that failed to see gun
ownership as a protected individual right. At the same time, the
federal government came to see public indifference to firearms
ownership as a major threat to national security, and responded by
slowly building a standing army and beginning a program to provide
guns directly to members of the militia at no cost.9 But popular
disinterest undermined both efforts, with government censuses
repeatedly revealing a surprising dearth of firearms.10 In brief, those
5. See id.
6. Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1141, 1141 (1996).
7. Daniel Lazare, Your Constitution Is Killing You: A Reconsideration of the Right to Bear
Arms, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1999, at 57, 59 (quoting Joyce Lee Malcolm).
8. See, e.g., A Second Amendment Symposium Issue, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1995); Saul
Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second Amendment and the
Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 221, 221-
46 (1999).
9. See ANNALS OF CONG., 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 1002-05, 1019-45 (1807), ANNALS OF
CONG., 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 2175-97 (1808).
10. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the House of Representatives (Mar. 1, 1803), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 163, 163-67 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew Clarke
eds., 1832); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Senate and the House of Representatives
(Mar. 22, 1804), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra, at 168, 168-72;
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responsible for its ratification never saw the Second Amendment as a
hindrance to government regulation of firearms or to efforts by the
federal government to arm specific groups of citizens."
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
There were a great number of guns in North America in 1783 as
a result of the Revolutionary War.12 Lacking any gun manufactories,
the United States had been lucky to acquire thousands of arms from
Europe; many of the firearms used by American troops during the
Revolution came from France and the Netherlands. 3 Those who led
the Continental army to victory understood that the United States put
itself in a precarious diplomatic and defensive position by depending
on European sources for firearms. 4 They also appreciated that the
thousands of French, Dutch, and British guns in American hands
would quickly decay and rot if not collected and maintained in
government arsenals. 5 They knew full well that no reliance could be
placed on the militia to provide for the new nation's security, internal
or external.' 6 The efforts of these nationalists to find and then create
a stable source of firearms for the United States began a long process
on the part of the federal government to arm its white male citizens. 7
On the other hand, many in the elite held the belief that more guns
equaled more to fear. Poor whites might put such weapons to an
incorrect, class-based use that could disrupt or destroy the new
nation. Senator Rufus King warned his colleagues in 1790 that "it
Letter from James Madison to the Senate and the House of Representatives (March 21, 1810),
in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra, at 258, 258-62; Letter from James
Monroe to the Senate (Feb. 26, 1821), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS,
supra, at 319, 321-23; Letter from Alex Macomb to Headquarters of the Army (Feb. 7, 1831), in
4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra, at 683,683-86.
11. See Michael Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearms
Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567, 567-89 (1998).
12. See Letter from Henry Knox to Congress (Jan. 3, 1784), in JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 123 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1904).
13. For a general discussion of the supply of arms to the United States, see HELEN
AUGUR, THE SECRET WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 13-20, 51-91 (1955); see also SAMUEL FLAGG
BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24-37, 48-54 (1957); ELIZABETH
MILES NUXOLL, CONGRESS AND THE MUNITIONS MERCHANTS: THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF
TRADE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1777, at 112-72, 343-421 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Report on a Military Peace Establishment, in 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 382-85 (Harold Syrett ed., 1962).
15. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Knox to Congress (Jan. 3, 1784), supra note 12, at 123.
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton).
17. See MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL
GUN CULTURE 172-260 (2000); LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY
AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 75-93 (1982).
2000]
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
was dangerous to put Arms into the hands of the Frontier People for
their defense, least they should Use them against the United States."'"
Nationalists found ample justification for their fears in Shays's
Rebellion. 19
The uprising in western Massachusetts in 1786 and 1787
presented an obvious indication of the dangers facing the country.
The Shaysites themselves kept insisting that their political protest
followed Revolutionary traditions.20  Facing serious economic
adversity and an unresponsive state government that used the courts
to aggressively pursue those who could not meet their debts,
hundreds of poor farmers acted as crowds often had in the colonial
period to close the courts and harass tax collectors.21  These
insurgents considered their protests legitimate, presenting petitions to
the General Court and holding county conventions when these
petitions failed to receive a response. 2
The Massachusetts government felt differently, acting with
energy in crushing what they saw as a rebellion; a challenge to
legitimate authority. As during many colonial conflicts, the Shaysite
crowd was the militia, limiting the state's ability to call on those forces
for support.2 3  Uninterested in compromise or negotiation, the
Massachusetts General Court declared the uprising an "open,
unnatural, unprovoked, and wicked rebellion. '24 The first clash came
at the Springfield arsenal, where Shays's followers, many of them
veterans, hoped to acquire the guns they needed to effectively resist
the state's army.25 The state's forces were well armed from the
arsenal's stores, which included muskets with bayonets, barrels of
powder, and a large quantity of shot and shell. 26 The only shots fired
were fourteen or fifteen rounds of grape from that artillery, which
killed four of the farmers and sent Shays's forces fleeing in terror.27 A
18. William Maclay, The Diary of William Maclay (April 16, 1790), in 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1791, at 245, 246
(Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
19. For a discussion of Shays's Rebellion, see CRESS, supra note 17, at 95-98.
20. See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN
INSURRECrION 39-40 (1980).
21. See id.
22. See ROBERT J. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REVOLUTION 103-27
(1954).
23. See SZATMARY, supra note 20, at 37-55.
24. Id. at 106.
25. See id. at 98-114.
26. See id. at 99.
27. See id. at 102.
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week later, General Benjamin Lincoln routed the remaining
insurgents without firing a shot, effectively ending Shays's
Rebellion.28
Though the rebels had not exactly distinguished themselves in
the martial arts, their uprising had far-reaching consequences.
George Washington wrote to James Madison that "[w]e are fast
verging to anarchy and confusion! '29 The crisis in Massachusetts was
but a local variant of a national problem requiring a federal solution. 0
The political elite unified around the notion that there was no room
for such insurrections in the new nation. George Washington wrote
Benjamin Lincoln, Jr., that the insurgents "had by their repeated
outrages forfeited all right to Citizenship."'3 Even Samuel Adams,
one of America's leading democrats, rejected pardon for the
Shaysites: "[T]he man who dares to rebel against the laws of a
republic ought to die."32  It would be very difficult to find an
American political leader who favored a right to insurrection against
duly-elected governments.
To those favoring a stronger national government, the American
Revolution had clearly demonstrated the flaws in the militia when
faced with a foreign invader, while the rebellion in Massachusetts
indicated the unreliability of the militia when confronted with
internal disorder. From Edmund Randolph's opening speech, the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 returned often to militia reform.33
The majority of those present hoped that the constitution they were
writing would prevent further disorder by bringing the militia under
more direct federal control. 34 In justifying writing an entirely new
government compact to supercede the Articles of Confederation,
Randolph gave as his first reason "that the confederation produced
no security agai[nst] foreign invasion . . . and that neither militia nor
draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only
28. See id. at 104-05.
29. Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Nov. 5, 1786), in 29 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-1799, at 51 (John Clement Fitzpatrick ed., 1931).
30. For a discussion of the impact of Shays's Rebellion on the militia's reputation, see
CRESS, supra note 17, at 95-98.
31. Letter from George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, Jr. (Feb. 24, 1787), in 29 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-1799, supra note 29, at 168.
32. 1 WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS: A HISTORY, 1636-1925, at 183 (John Lockwood et al.
eds., 1926).
33. See James Madison, Madison's Notes (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE




could be successful." 35 The "common defence" required some sort of
national army. The Revolution demonstrated that "[violunteers [are]
not to be depended on" in case of war; while "[m]ilitia [are] difficult
to be collected and almost impossible to be kept in the field ....
Nothing short of a regular military force will answer .... ",36
Randolph did not seek to terminate the militia; rather, in Alexander
Hamilton's words, "[T]he Militia of all the States [are] to be under
the sole and exclusive direction of the United States." 37
A few delegates worried that the states would lose their
sovereignty if the militia came under federal control, while Rufus
King and Gouverneur Morris feared that Northern militia would be
called upon to put down slave insurrections. 38 General Charles
Pinckney, who held that "[u]niformity was essential" in the militia as
"[t]he States would never keep up a proper discipline of their
militia, '39 dismissed all these objections as pointless "distrust of the
Genl. Govt. '40 John Langdon agreed, finding "no more reason to be
afraid of the Genl. Govt than of the State Govts. ' '41 The overriding
sense of the Convention was that the militia could not be expected to,
as Randolph put it, "suppress domestic commotions" 2 and required
federal supervision. The alternative was disorder.43
Historians have amply demonstrated the difficulty of ascribing to
the framers of the Constitution a consensus on their original
intention. The Constitutional Convention hammered out a document
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 25.
37. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 139 (1966).
38. See James Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug. 18, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 330.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 331.
41. Id.
42. James Madison, Madison's Notes (July 18, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 47.
43. The debate over the federal regulation of the militia can be followed in James
Madison's Notes in The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. See Madison, supra note 42,
at 47-49; Committee of Detail, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 33, at 133-37, 144-48, 159, 168, 174; James Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug. 6, 1787),
in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 182; James
Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug. 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 33, at 316-18; Madison, supra note 38, at 323-33; James Madison, Madison's
Notes (Aug. 21, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
33, at 352-56; James Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug. 22, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 368; James Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug.
23, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 380-90;
James Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug. 30, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 459, 466-67.
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full of compromises and barely obtained concessions. 44 One point at
least won complete agreement: Congress should arm the militia.
Some delegates called for the states to organize and discipline the
militia, but no one stated that any state could keep its militia well
armed; everyone agreed with the need for federal guidance. 45 Luther
Martin, a member of the Philadelphia Convention who turned
Antifederalist, told the Maryland Assembly that "As to giving such a
power [to regulate the militia], there was no objection; but it was
thought by some, that this power ought to be given with certain
restrictions.'46 Martin had hoped for a limitation on the president's
power to order a militia beyond the borders of its home state.47 The
Convention brushed aside this proposal and agreed with James
Madison that the whole purpose of federal regulation "is to secure an
effectual discipline of the Militia. '48 The states had repeatedly proven
their inability to arm, discipline, and deliver their militia when called
upon. Madison stated, "The States neglect their Militia now, and the
more they are consolidated into one nation, the less each will rely on
its own interior provisions for its safety .... The Discipline of the
Militia is evidently a National concern, and ought to be provided for
in the National Constitution."'49
Madison had his way, as Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution
made Congress responsible for "organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia."50  Some modern observers argue that the framers
perceived the militia as a check on governmental power; yet the
Constitution accomplishes the exact opposite goal, making the militia
a potential tool of the central government for the repression of any
challenge to federal authority.5 Congress had the authority to call
forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
44. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 212, 212-14 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977); see also JACK N.
RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 147-66 (1998)
[hereinafter RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS]; H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA.
L. REV. 684 (1987). See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS].
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. Martin's Genuine Information, December 28, 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 172, 207.
47. See id. at 207-09.
48. James Madison, Madison's Notes (Aug. 23, 1787), supra note 43, at 384, 386.
49. Id. at 387.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
51. See Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second
Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY 0. 39,44 (1998).
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insurrections, and repel invasions.52
Under the Constitution, the new federal government held the
traditional political power of controlling the supply of and access to
firearms.', Colonial American governments had followed the British
precedent in maintaining authority over firearms.14 Guns were used
and owned at sufferance, the state reserving the right to limit,
regulate, or impress those arms at its discretion. Under common law
this "reserved right of the sovereign" 5 differed from eminent domain,
lacking a requirement for just compensation.5 6 Since firearms were
always seen as in the service of the monarch, impressing guns did not
require a special act of parliament.57 The American Revolution did
not change that English heritage, as the loyalists discovered when
their firearms were confiscated.58 State legislatures needed no further
argument than public safety, or in constitutional terms, the states
police powers, to justify gun regulation. In this regard they adhered
to the English common-law heritage and the practice of every
European nation.59 Gun regulation in the Revolutionary period, and
after, aroused amazingly little debate beyond accusations that they
were not stringent enough or rigorously enforced. The authority of
the state to regulate gun ownership was repeatedly framed by the
need to arm the militia.60
52. See id.
53. See Don Higginbotham, The Second Amendment in Historical Context, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 263, 263-68 (1999).
54. See Bellesiles, supra note 11, at 567-89.
55. Id. at 586.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. The precise concept of eminent domain was not known under English common law;
until the 1770s the taking of property by the sovereign required a special act of parliament. See
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138-39, *222, *290-96.
59. See Bellesiles, supra note 11, at 586. There is surprisingly little comparative history on
legal development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See, e.g., P.B. MUNSCHE,
GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS, 1671-1831, at 8-32 (1981).
60. See, e.g., By the Council in Assembly (Oct. 26, 1711), in 29 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND:
PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 10-11 (William Hand
Brown ed., 1909) [hereinafter ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND]; By the President and Council in
Assembly (Oct. 27, 1711), in 29 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra, at 47; By the House of
Delegates (Nov. 7, 1712), in 29 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra, at 98; By the President and
Council in Assembly (Nov. 6, 1712), in 29 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra, at 153-54; By the
House of Delegates (Nov. 10, 1793), in 29 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra, at 237-39; By the
House of Delegates (July 2, 1714), in 29 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra, at 376-78. For a
discussion of federal attempts to isolate loyalists from the militia, see, for example, ROBERT
MCCLUER CALHOON, THE LOYALISTS IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 295-304, 397-414, 439-
78 (1973); ALEXANDER CLARENCE FLICK, LOYALISM IN NEW YORK DURING THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 58-94 (1969); ROBERT STANSBURY LAMBERT, SOUTH CAROLINA LOYALISTS IN
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33-58 (1987).
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The Constitution's treatment of the militia was in keeping with
the Articles of Confederation and the several state constitutions that
aimed to craft a workable militia structure. The Articles, passed by
Congress in 1777, though not approved by the states until 1781, made
the states responsible for the arming and regulation of the militia.61
Article 6 stated that "every State shall always keep up a well
regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered,
and shall provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a
due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms,
ammunition and camp equipage. '62  The first state constitutions
included a range of militia-and gun-related articles. The Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 stated that "a well-regulated militia,
composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper,
natural and safe defence of a free state ... and that in all cases, the
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the
civil power." 63 It is hard to miss those opening words, in which
Virginia declared the necessity of a state-directed militia, trained in
the use of firearms.64
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 proclaimed that "[t]he
people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defence. '65 That right did not place the individual beyond the
discipline of the state, for the next sentence stated that "[a]nd as in
time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be
maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military
power shall always be held in exact subordination to the civil
authority, and be governed by it."66 Article 4, Section 1 of the
Massachusetts Constitution granted the legislature authority to pass
laws for the support and regulation of the state's militia, while Article
12 required all militia officers to report to the governor every three
months on the number of arms and other military equipment held in
his unit.67 Even privately owned guns were held at state sufferance.
61. See Articles of Confederation (Nov. 15, 1777), in SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE
OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1861, at 9 (William MacDonald ed., 1898).
62. Id.
63. Virginia Bill of Rights, Article 13, reprinted in SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FORMATION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 151 (Samuel Eliot Morison ed., 1970).
64. See id.
65. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII.
66. Id.
67. See Extracts from the Constitution of Massachusetts, reprinted in MILITIA LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND MASSACHUSETTS 1-2 (Henry A.S. Dearborn ed., 1836).
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The notion that an individual should be allowed to use a firearm
without regard to state regulation appeared ludicrous to
Massachusetts's political leadership. John Adams clarified that such
an unhindered right to gun ownership would "demolish every
constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed
by no man-it is a dissolution of the government." 68
The most seemingly individualist renderings of gun rights must
be matched against the actions of those responsible for these
statements. For instance, the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution
declared that
The people have a right to bear arms for the defense [of]
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in time of peace
are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; And the
military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed
by the civil power.69
Again, it is the state's authority that stands out in this declaration.
The state of Pennsylvania did not hesitate to exercise that authority,
disarming loyalists and anyone else who refused to take an oath of
allegiance to the government. Gun ownership in Pennsylvania was
premised on the notion that the individual would use that weapon in
the state's defense when called upon. To make the point completely
clear, the state required an oath to that effect.70  The Test Act
mandated the disarming of those who would not take the oath of
allegiance. 71 As Don Higginbotham points out, "In all the discussions
and debates, from the Revolution to the eve of the Civil War, there is
precious little evidence that advocates of local control of the militia
showed an equal or even a secondary concern for gun ownership as a
personal right. '72
The militia provisions of the Constitution outraged the
Antifederalists, who insisted on state control. The Antifederalists
sought limits on the powers of the central government rather than an
enhancement of individual rights. 73  After the Philadelphia
68. 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 475 (1787).
69. Pennsylvania Convention, Declaration of Rights (Aug. 21, 1776), reprinted in RAKOVE,
DECLARING RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 86-87.
70. See Cornell, supra note 8, at 228.
71. See id.
72. Higginbotham, supra note 51, at 40.
73. See, e.g., Philadelphia County Petition to Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 316, 316-19
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); Plain Citizen, To the Honorable Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania (Nov. 22, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
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Convention, Luther Martin and other Antifederalists imagined every
possible scenario of federal tyranny rendering the states impotent.
Under the Constitution, Martin charged, Congress could decide not
to arm the militia, with the result that the militia would have few, if
any, guns. Patrick Henry pursued this reasoning, suggesting that
Congress could render the states defenseless. 74 A militia abandoned
by the federal government registered as a substantial threat to states
that actively repressed and enslaved a large minority, or in South
Carolina, a majority of their population. Henry asked, "Of what
service would militia be to you, when most probably you will not have
a single musket in the State; for as arms are to be provided by
Congress, they may or may not furnish them. ' 75 Apparently Martin
and Henry believed that the people were incapable of acquiring their
own firearms. As Henry explained, if the federal government
"neglect[s] or refuse[s] to discipline or arm our militia, they will be
useless: the states can do neither. '76 To not arm the militia was to
leave them unarmed. While Henry feared what Congress would not
do, others suspected that the federal government would use its
control over the militia to oppress the states.77
Not surprisingly, Federalists found it absurd that anyone would
think that the central government would either send the militia into
one state at a time to attain supremacy or disarm the militia through
inaction. After all, it was Congress, with representatives drawn from
those very states, that would pass the necessary legislation. In his
reply to Martin, Oliver Ellsworth charged that "[o]ne hour you
sported the opinion that Congress, afraid of the militia resisting their
measures, would neither arm nor organize them, and the next, as if
men required no time to breathe between such contradictions, that
they would harass them by long and unnecessary marches .... ,,78 It
seemed to Ellsworth that the Antifederalists wanted both sides of the
argument, fearing that the federal government would both arm and
THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 289, 289-92.
74. See Patrick Henry, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 951, 957 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990).
75. 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 217 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
76. The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution, in 3 DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 52 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891).
77. See CRESS, supra note 17, at 98-102.
78. Letter from Landholder to Luther Martin, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 272.
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fail to arm the militia.79
Federalists found an additional flaw in Antifederalist logic: the
Constitution left the militia under the direct control of the states
when not in national service.80 As Edmund Randolph observed,
militia officers were all appointed by the state governments and were
therefore unlikely to act contrary to their own states' interests. 1 For
the Federalists, the Constitution's Militia Clauses operated within
their understanding of concurrent power. The state and federal
governments shared authority over the militia. The Constitution
made Congress responsible for organizing and arming the militia, but
nothing in that wording contradicted the states' ability to use the
militia as they saw fit when not in active federal service. Any state
could act to correct flaws in its militia, such as a paucity of firearms.
The militia, Federalists argued, would neither be so strong as to
become a standing army, nor so weak as to be ineffectual against
domestic insurrection.82  Most Federalists followed the lead of
Madison and Randolph at the Virginia Ratifying Convention in
maintaining that a federally regulated militia was the best way of
avoiding a standing army.83
However, the Federalists were a bit disingenuous in insisting that
a well-regulated militia would allow the United States to avoid a
standing army. They had every expectation that the new
constitutional government would build a more powerful army.
Certainly most Federalists would have agreed with Gouverneur
Morris's later assessment that "[a]n overweening vanity leads the
many, each man against the conviction of his own heart, to believe or
affect to believe, that militia can beat veteran troops in the open
field." 84 At the Constitutional Convention, Morris wrote, "this idle
notion, fed by vaunting demagogues, alarmed us" into giving support
79. For Martin's response, see 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 33, at 286-95.
80. See, e.g., Francis Corbin, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at
1006, 1006-14; Henry Lee, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 9, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at
1072, 1074; Edmund Randolph, Debates at the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at
1092, 1102.
81. See Higginbotham, supra note 51, at 49.
82. See id. at 50.
83. See Philadelphia County Petition to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787),
supra note 73, at 318-19.
84. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent (Jan. 12, 1815), in 3 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 33, at 420.
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to the militia.85  They should have recalled better the American
Revolution, which taught that "to rely on militia was to lean on a
broken reed. '8 6 Alexander Hamilton was more succinct:
I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural
bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defence. This
doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence....
The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this
kind, are too recent to permit us to be dupes of such a suggestion. 87
The only politically rational alternative was to bring the militia under
federal control while also building a real American army.
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT
James Madison had promised during the ratification process to
consider amendments to the Constitution. Madison kept his word, 88
an amazing political action. Several of the recommended
amendments addressed the structure of the militia, including
limitations on the number of militia under federal control, specifics of
their training, the nature and duration of martial law, the use of
militia beyond a state's borders, the status of conscientious objectors,
and the degree of state control over the militia.89 None became part
of the Second Amendment.90
Madison rejected all changes to the Constitution that he thought
would weaken the federal government, including its control over the
militia. As he rhetorically asked, "For whose benefit is the militia
organized, armed and disciplined? for the benefit of the United
States."91 He was willing to respond to the fears of the Antifederalists
by granting the states, in Carl Bogus's words, "a concurrent authority
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 156-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library College
ed.).
88. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 44, at 325-36.
89. See Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11, 12 (Helen E. Veit et
al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS]; House Committee Report (July
28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 29, 30; House Resolution and
Articles of Amendment (August 24, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra,
at 37, 37-41; The Congressional Register (August 17, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra, at 182, 182-85; Roger Sherman's Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28,
1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 266, 266-68.
90. See Higginbotham, supra note 51, at 48.
91. James Madison, Debates in the House of Representatives (Dec. 23, 1790), in 14
DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 173 (William C. diGiacomantonio et al. eds.,
1995).
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to arm their militia. ' 92 The result was a single sentence with a
clarifying preamble: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed. '93
Madison stated his own understanding of the Second
Amendment when he presented it to the House of Representatives.
Madison stated, "In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to
guard against the abuse in the executive department than any other;
because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the weaker." 94
The people had no need to fear their national government, for it had
few means that it could exert its authority. The real danger was closer
to home, in a tyrannical majority lacking checks on its democratic
power. Madison explained:
[11n a government modified like this of the United States, the great
danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative
body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be levelled against
that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which
possesses the highest prerogative of power: But this [is] not found in
either the executive or legislative departments of government, but in
the body of the people, operating by the majority against the
minority.95
Madison feared an unrestrained citizenry, and the Bill of Rights, he
thought, should protect the minority against the majority's
transgressions.96
The Second Amendment's purpose may be fairly indicated by
the ensuing debate and legislation. The House debate focused on two
issues: the use of the militia in preventing the establishment of a
standing army, and the wisdom of allowing religious exemptions for
service in the militia.97 The congressional legislation that followed
uniformly sought to regulate the militia, starting with the Uniform
92. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
309, 352 (1997).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
94. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in
RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 176.
95. Id. at 177.
96. See id.
97. See The Congressional Register (Aug. 17, 1789), supra note 89, at 182-84; Gazette of
the United States (Aug. 22, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 89,
at 198, 198-99. Roger Sherman's version of the Bill of Rights, which played a key role in the
congressional debates, addresses only the militia, with no reference to a right to bear arms. See
Roger Sherman's Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), supra note 89, at 266-68.
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Militia Act of 1792.98 Meanwhile, legislatures in every state further
revealed their understanding of gun rights in the limitations they
imposed on gun ownership, whether in denying that right to blacks,
Catholics, Indians, or the foreign born. 9 The leaders of the new
nation followed Washington's lead in calling for a standing army
backed by a smaller, organized, and better armed militia.1°° The
Constitution provided the framework for such a structure. The first
Congress set about giving it shape.01
III. GUN OWNERSHIP UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The Second Amendment was part of the Constitution in 1794
when the Whiskey Rebellion broke out in western Pennsylvania. 12
As Saul Cornell has shown, even leading Antifederalists supported
suppressing this threat to internal security. 10' With congressional
support, President Washington moved quickly to exercise his
constitutional authority to call out the militia to put down a domestic
insurrection. 104 In the process, Washington became more convinced
than ever that little or no reliance was to be placed on the militia. 0 5
Washington issued a call for 13,000 militiamen from Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey. 10 6 Ironically, one of the
prime demands of the Whiskey Rebels was a stronger standing
army. 07 While Pennsylvania's Governor Thomas Mifflin successfully
kept firearms out of the hands of the western militia, Washington
opened the federal repositories to arm the troops he led into the field
against the Whiskey Rebels. 108 The rebellion simply evaporated
before Washington's show of force; the only deaths came from a
98. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat.
775 (1903).
99. See Bellesiles, supra note 11, at 589.
100. See, e.g., Michael Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16
CONST. COMMENTARY 247, 247-62 (1999).
101. See WALTER MILLIS, ARMS AND MEN: A STUDY IN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY
38-39 (1956).
102. See Cornell, supra note 8, at 231.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See CRESS, supra note 17, at 130-34; RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE
FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-
1802, at 120-23, 145-48 (1975).
106. See CRESS, supra note 17, at 121-27.
107. See id.
108. See THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 192-206 (1986).
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pistol going off accidentally and a drunken brawl that ended with a
fatal bayonet wound. 1°9 One can only speculate whether the Whiskey
Rebels would have behaved differently had they known that
Washington's troops were so ignorant of firearm use. Hardly a
disciplined force, the militia looted, drank heavily, and beat civilians
randomly.110 It was neither well trained nor well armed. General
Samuel Smith, commander of the Maryland militia, reported to the
House of Representatives that the majority of the Virginia and
Maryland troops was ignorant of the use of arms.' Many did not
know how to load a musket."2  Even young gentlemen like
Meriwether Lewis reported for duty without a gun." 3 Secretary of
War Henry Knox reported that only one-third of the militia called up
to respond to the Whiskey Rebellion bore arms.114 The rest had to be
supplied from federal stockpiles.1"5
Such reports on the inadequacies of the militia in the Whiskey
Rebellion led to renewed calls for a select militia and a stronger
standing army. Lawrence Delbert Cress has written, "The militia had
only reluctantly taken up arms, and then only after the infusion of a
large number of substitutes and volunteers. 116 Even many of the
administration's opponents, soon to be known as Democratic
Republicans, now doubted the worth of the militia; and former
Antifederalists joined in supporting the disarming of the Whiskey
Rebels, despite the Second Amendment."'7 One of these men,
William Findley, who had sympathized with the rebels, was appalled
by the militia's conduct.1 8 The first necessity of any republic had to
be public order; if the militia could not handle it, Findley stated, then
a standing army would." 9 Federalists and Republicans agreed that
the task of the militia was to enforce social order; they also agreed
109. See id. at 205-06.
110. See id. at 206-21.
111. See Frank A. Cassell, Samuel Smith: Merchant Politician, 1792-1812, at 44-45 (1968)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with Northwestern
University Library).
112. See id.
113. See Letter from Meriwether Lewis to Lucy Marks (Oct. 4, 1794) (on file with Missouri
State Historical Society).
114. See Letter from Henry Knox to the House of Representatives (Dec. 10, 1794), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 69, 69-71.
115. See id.
116. CRESS, supra note 17, at 128.
117. See Cornell, supra note 8, at 231-37, 242-46.
118. See WILLIAM FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN
COUNTIES OF PENNSYLVANIA 165-68 (1796).
119. See id.
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that there was a great deal of room for improvement. 20
Washington and Knox used the Whiskey Rebellion to keep the
army fully supplied.' 2' The army, however, had to content itself with
weapons from the American Revolution cleaned and repaired at
West Point, an inadequate situation in Washington's eyes. 22 Two
problems therefore faced the American defensive establishment in
the 1790s: the unorganized and untrained condition of the militia, and
the impending shortage of usable firearms. The Federalists proposed
two obvious solutions: a select militia, and federal support for a
domestic firearms industry. 123
Debates over the militia dominated the first federal Congress.24
These carefully considered discussions even addressed the exact bore
of the muskets to be used by the militia.25 The representatives
returned repeatedly to just how much authority the federal
government should have in exercising its constitutional mandate of
regulating the militia.2 6 Several representatives noted that every
increase in federal power came at the expense of the states while
others doubted the value of the militia.2 7  Thomas Fitzsimmons
rejected the need for militia training as "a great tax on the
community, productive of little instruction or edification, either in
regard to military tactics, or the morals of a civilized nation.' 128 Most
members, however, agreed with Roger Sherman of Connecticut that
"the different states had certainly an inherent right to arm and
protect the lives and property of the citizens. '' 129 But to "[m]ore
effectively... exercise this right... [the states needed] to give up to
the general government the power of fixing what arms the militia
should use, by what discipline they should be regulated," 30 and
120. See Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of State (Oct. 16, 1794), in 34 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-1799, supra note 29, at 1, 2-3.
121. See WILLIAM H. GUTHMAN, MARCH TO MASSACRE: A HISTORY OF THE FIRST SEVEN
YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1784-1791, at 93 (1975).
122. See id.
123. See BELLESILES, supra note 17, at 219-46.
124. See generally Debates in the House of Representatives, Third Session, in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-




128. The Pennsylvania Packet (Dec. 18, 1790), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1791, supra note 18, at 54, 56.
129. The General Advertiser (Dec. 20, 1790), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF




various other forms of ordering the nature of the militia. The only
power left to the states in this formulation was "the right to say what
descriptions of persons should compose the militia, and to appoint the
officers that were to command it."'131 Joshua Seney of Maryland
thought even this latter qualification granted the states power that
they could easily abuse.132
While Congress was quite willing to grant the president control
over the militia, it did not support his pet plan for a select militia.
Washington agreed completely with Baron De Steuben's dismissal of
the "flattering but . . mistaken idea-that every Citizen should be a
Soldier.' ' 33 The Revolution had made clear that "the use of arms is as
[much] a trade as shoe or boot making." 134 Every year, Secretary of
War Knox proposed to Congress that they create an active, highly
trained (ten to thirty days per year), and well-armed reserve that
could be called into service by a state or the federal government. 35
As in all of the militia proposals of the antebellum years, the federal
government would supply guns to those serving in the select militia. 136
The "universal militia" would become nothing more than a way of
registering all those eligible to carry arms in time of war.137
Knox's proposal was logical, legal, and necessary, and would
have aided the nation enormously in a range of future crises.
Congress, however, would have nothing to do with it. The people's
representatives may have shared the view of former Antifederalist
John Smilie of Pennsylvania, who warned that "[w]hen a select militia
is formed; the people in general may be disarmed.' 1 38 But Smilie, like
most Antifederalists, had no problem granting the state the authority
to decide who should be allowed to serve in the militia, or to limit
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. BARON DE STEUBEN, A LETrER ON THE SUBJECT OF AN ESTABLISHED MILITIA, AND
MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS, ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED STATES 7 (1784).
134. Id.
135. See generally Henry Knox, A Plan for the General Arrangement of the Militia of the
United States (1786). For a description of Knox's 1786 plan with commentary, see JOHN
MCAULEY PALMER, WASHINGTON, LINCOLN, WILSON: THREE WAR STATESMEN 84-94
(1930).
136. See Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (May 2, 1783), in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1745-1799, supra note 29, at 374, 388-89. For a
discussion of Washington's proposals, see CRESS, supra note 17, at 84-85; for Knox's proposals,
see id. at 90-92.
137. See Henry Knox, A Plan for the General Arrangement of the Militia of the United
States (1790), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 6, 6-13.
138. The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 6, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 73, at 509.
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those ineligible from owning guns. 39 Nor did most Antifederalists
want to see the propertyless carrying arms in or out of the militia.' 40
The debate over the future of the militia demonstrated an
ideological fissure in America. Federalists looked to Europe and saw
that warfare was changing fast, with massive armies and well-trained
corps of light infantry sweeping away the last remnants of medieval
warfare. Harrison Gray Otis insisted that at least a few men must be
trained in modern methods of warfare, if only to advise the militia
when war came.14' To prevent disaster, the country needed a larger
army staffed by professional soldiers and a centralized select militia
subject to extended training. Federalist support for volunteer militia
companies appeared to republicans an obvious assault on the ideal of
a universal militia. 142 The fact that the universal militia had never
existed and that the current militia showed no signs of life remained
irrelevant to this ideological absolute. 143
A curious side effect of these heated debates over the militia was
a brief militia revival-a resurgence born of political fears. In 1798
and 1799, faced with the threat of war with France, Federalists called
for a stronger army and more centralized militia. Wild rumors
circulated widely, including that Republicans were hoarding arms and
that Hamilton was going to lead the army against domestic
opponents. 44 Federalist John Nicholas published a letter accusing the
Virginia legislature of storing arms in the capitol for use in a rebellion
against the federal government. 45  He found evidence in the
legislature's recent reorganization of the militia and its appropriation
of funds to buy arms for the militia and to build an armory in
Richmond.146 Federalists in Richmond and Petersburg responded by
organizing the first private militia companies.147 Shortly thereafter,
139. See George Mason, Speech to the Virginia Convention (June 18, 1788), in 10 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 73, at
1312, 1312.
140. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 341-42.
141. See Letter from James McHenry to Harrison G. Otis (Jan. 31, 1800), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 142, 142-44.
142. See ANNALS OF CONG., 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 304-06 (1800).
143. See THEODORE J. CRACKEL, MR. JEFFERSON'S ARMY: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
REFORM OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 17-35 (1987).
144. See JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW
NATION IN CRISIS 203 (1993).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See LISLE A. ROSE, PROLOGUE TO DEMOCRACY: THE FEDERALISTS IN THE SOUTH,
1789-1800, at 219-23 (1968).
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republicans in Philadelphia organized their first private militia
company, the Republican Blues, "in order to defend the country
against foreign and domestic enemies and [to] support the laws."'' 14
Pressured by the states, Congress passed a new militia act, but
Maryland's Governor Stone refused to cooperate until the federal
government reimbursed the state for the arms it lost during the
Whiskey Rebellion. 149 Along with the threat, Stone sent a request for
new arms for the militia, reporting that the state was dangerously
under-equipped. 150 The next governor repeated these entreaties and
was also ignored.'51
The private, volunteer companies were generally better armed
and far more enthusiastic than their state-sponsored counterparts.
For instance, the Washington artillery of Washington, D.C., which
started during this crisis, maintained its exclusivity by requiring the
election of new members. 1 2 Recruits were expected to supply their
complete uniform as a sign of seriousness, but guns came from the
company's private supply, which was sufficient for the entire troop. 53
A new member of the company did not have to own a gun, but he did
need a tailor. In comparison, during the war scare of 1798, the nearby
Alexandria militia regiment frantically turned to the Virginia
government for additional muskets. 54  The governor offered 250
muskets, noting that requests for arms were coming in from militia
companies all over Virginia.15  The Fairfax County militia was in
slightly better shape, needing only 250 guns to finish arming their 563
militiamen. 56 The regular militia seemed a lost cause to many. In
1800, Secretary of War James McHenry wrote the chair of the House
Committee on Defense that "even in times of the greatest danger, we
cannot give to our militia that degree of discipline ... upon which a
nation may safely hazard its fate."'57
148. SHARP, supra note 144, at 252.
149. See Letter from J.H. Stone to James McHenry (Aug. 7, 1797) (on file with the
Maryland State Archives).
150. See id.
151. See Martin K. Gordon, The Militia of the District of Columbia, 1790-1815, at 38, 40
(1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University) (on file with George
Washington University Library).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 36-37.
154. See James Wood, To John Dundas, Esq., Mayor of Alexandria Richmond,
ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, May 31, 1798, at 5.
155. See Gordon, supra note 151, at 58-59.
156. See Letter from Roger West to James Wood (June 6, 1798), in 8 CALENDAR OF
VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS 487-88 (1890).
157. Letter from James McHenry to Harrison G. Otis (Jan. 31, 1800), supra note 141, at 142.
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In the midst of these military preparations, the Fries Rebellion
temporarily disrupted southeast Pennsylvania. 158 Outraged by the
new direct federal tax on houses, lands, and slaves, as well as by the
Alien and Sedition Acts, groups of citizens defied federal authority.159
In the first months of 1799, the rebels-most members of the militia-
threatened tax assessors, forcing one to "dance around" a liberty
pole, while another was "committed to an old stable and ...fed
rotten corn."'16 But the insurgents' greatest crime came when John
Fries, a local militia commander, led men armed with swords, clubs,
and muskets to free some prisoners. 6' No shots were fired in this
traditional effort to protest corrupt authority in what Fries's attorney
Alexander Dallas called a "system of intimidation.' 1 62 To President
John Adams, this system was treasonous, and he ordered five
hundred federal troops under General William MacPherson to put
down the uprising. 63 There was no resistance and no violence as this
little army disarmed the rebels and rounded up their leaders.'6 Fries
and two others were arrested, tried, convicted, and pardoned, and
that was the end of it.165 As with the Whiskey Rebellion, the
insurgents found little support once the government acted. Even
ardent Jeffersonians, while objecting to the use of federal troops
instead of the state militia, agreed that anyone challenging federal
authority should be brought to justice. 66 There was no reference to
the Second Amendment when Fries's supporters were disarmed by
the state.
Following on the heels of the war scare and "rebellion" in
Pennsylvania came the closely contested national election of 1800.167
It briefly looked as though the "Revolution of 1800" would be just
that. But the poorly prepared state of the participants suggests that it
would have been a relatively bloodless affair. 168 As rumors spread
that the Federalists might prevent Thomas Jefferson from taking
158. See SHARP, supra note 144, at 209-10.
159. See id.
160. Peter Levine, The Fries Rebellion: Social Violence and the Politics of the New Nation, 40
PA. HIST. 241, 248 (1973).
161. See THOMAS CARPENTER, THE TWO TRIALS OF JOHN FRIES ON AN INDICTMENT OF
TREASON 21, 75 (1800); see also SHARP, supra note 144, at 209-10.
162. Levine, supra note 160, at 249.
163. See id. at 250-54.
164. See id.
165. See SHARP, supra note 144, at 210.
166. See Levine, supra note 160, at 249-50.




office in 1801, republican John Beckley of Pennsylvania charged that
Federalists had removed "several hundred stand of arms and 18
pieces of cannon, heretofore in the hands of the Militia .... into the
public arsenals of the U.S. '' 169 Fearing a showdown, Governor
Monroe of Virginia planned for the Virginia militia to block any
effort by federal troops to remove the federal arms stored in Virginia
by seizing them for state use.170 Monroe even sent a spy to check the
quality of these arms.171 Major T.M. Randolph reported that these
"4000 excellent muskets and bayonets" had been captured from the
British at Yorktown.172 Governor Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania
was even more emphatic in his preparations, informing Jefferson that
"arms for upwards to twenty thousand were secured" by his
government for the militia in case their service was required. 173 He
did not expect them to bring their own arms, but planned to supply
the militia with state and federal arms. 174 But as the crisis passed with
the temporary resolution of the conflict with France and the peaceful
inauguration of Thomas Jefferson, military enthusiasm waned, and
militia companies throughout the country died a peaceful death.'75
IV. THE SEARCH FOR GUNS
In some ways the militia debates of the 1790s skirted a far more
important issue. Real political independence required military
independence, which in turn necessitated a domestic arms industry.
Every state saw it as the government's responsibility to, in the words
of Georgia's militia law, "Arm and Array" the militia "for
suppressing all such insurrections, as may happen.' 176 But no state
was able to meet this goal on its own, even when faced with
insurrection. At such times of crisis the states turned to the federal
government, which would frantically attempt to find sufficient guns
for the militia. But most national leaders agreed that such an
approach posed dangers to the nation. Washington raised this
question in his first annual message to Congress in 1790, clearly
169. Id. at 268.
170. See id. at 268-69.
171. See id. at 270.
172. Letter from Major Thomas Mann Randolph to Governor James Monroe (Feb. 14,
1801) (on file with the Library of Congress).
173. SHARP, supra note 144, at 269.
174. See id.
175. See Gordon, supra note 151, at 84.
176. Act of 1778, in 19 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA: STATUTES
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY, 1774 TO 1805, at 104 (1970).
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stating the lessons he had learned in the war: "A free people ought
not only be armed, but disciplined . . . and their safety and interest
require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render
them independent of others for essential, particularly military
supplies." '177 Over the ensuing seventy years, the federal government
worked to make the United States self-sufficient in arms
production. 17 8
Washington, Secretary of War Knox, Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton, and every member of Congress who had
participated in the American Revolution knew that most Americans
did not own guns and had no interest in buying them. As Hamilton
said, guns were not "objects of ordinary and indispensable private
consumption or use.1' 79 It was evident to Hamilton that private
demand for firearms would never lead to a sufficient supply for the
military, and, since guns were most important as military weapons,
domestic production should be encouraged by the government. 18°
Eighteenth- and twentieth-century experts agree that firearms used
by professionals, soldiers, and hunters had a life expectancy between
three and twelve years. 181  At that point they needed serious
maintenance and repair, or to be replaced. 182 The British army, which
required the regular cleaning and inspection of all its guns, replaced
roughly one-tenth of its well-made Brown Besses every year before
the Napoleonic Wars. 183 Using this replacement rate, and taking no
account of population growth, means that Americans, if indeed every
adult white male used a gun regularly to hunt, needed to purchase
some 50,000 guns a year by 1800.184 Where were they to find this
many guns?
The first Militia Act in 1792 amply demonstrated the problems
inherent in any effort to arm the militia or army. Congress, trying to
177. George Washington, First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), in 1 THE ADDRESSES AND
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (James Richardson ed. & compiler,
1839).
178. See BELLESILES, supra note 17, at 208-429.
179. Alexander Hamilton's Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in 10
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 317 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966).
180. See id.
181. See BRIAN J. GIVEN, A MOST PERNICIOUS THING: GUN TRADING AND NATIVE
WARFARE IN THE EARLY CONTACT PERIOD 90-92 (1994); J.A. HOULDING, FIT FOR SERVICE:
THE TRAINING OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 1715-1795, at 139-41 (1981); J.R. WESTERN, THE
ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL ISSUE, 1660-
1802, at 342-43 (1965).





keep the militia alive, passed "An Act More effectually to provide for
the National Defence. ' 185  This act declared that "every free able-
bodied white male citizen"'186 between the ages of eighteen and forty-
five should be enrolled in the militia and must appear "when called
out to exercise." 187 Further, "every citizen so enrolled and notified,
shall ... provide himself with a good musket or firelock" and other
accoutrements. 188 Despite this call for each individual to supply his own
gun, Congress intended to take over the responsibility of providing firearms,
specifying that within five years all muskets "shall be of bores sufficient
for balls of the eighteenth-part of a pound."'189 All arms and
ammunition intended for militia use remained exempt from
attachment in any civil suit.19°  To keep track of its arms, each
company was to make regular returns of arms and ammunition to
each state's adjutant general, who in turn reported directly to the
president. 191 To begin this process, Congress ordered the purchase of
7,000 muskets.1 92 Over the next two years the government was able to
purchase only 480 "rifle guns. '1 93
The experience of individual states matched warnings from the
executive branch. Late in 1792, during a brief conflict with the
Creeks, Charles Pinckney reported to the South Carolina assembly
that the frontier militia was dangerously under-armed.194 The western
counties "if properly supplied by Government with the means, [are]
well disposed to exert themselves in defence of their possessions,' ' 195
but the state lacked sufficient stores to arm them. Governor Moultrie
added his voice in alarm over "the defenceless Situation of the
Frontier Inhabitants for want of Arms and Ammunition."1 96 The
185. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903).





191. See MILITIA LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 67, at
13.
192. See id. at 8-10.
193. 1 CAPTAIN JAMES E. HICKS, NOTES ON UNITED STATES ORDNANCE 14 (1940).
194. See Letter from Charles Pinckney to the House of Representatives (Nov. 30, 1792), in
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, at 38-39 (1988); Letter from
Governor Moultrie to the House of Representatives (Dec. 14, 1792), in JOURNALS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra, at 182.
195. Letter from Charles Pinckney to the House of Representatives (Nov. 30, 1792), in
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 39.
196. Letter from Governor Moultrie to the House of Representatives (Dec. 14, 1792), in
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 182.
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legislature ordered that the two hundred stands of arms stored in the
state house should be sent west and authorized the governor to
purchase six hundred more muskets for public use.197 It took a year to
acquire these guns, by which time the state government determined
that it needed even more guns, which it attempted to acquire in
Philadelphia. 198 To insure that these state guns were better cared for,
the legislature ordered the building of an arsenal capable of holding
arms for 5,000 men at Abbeville. 199 This arsenal was finished in
December 1793, and the state then tried, unsuccessfully, to get the
national government to pay for it.2°° Whenever even a limited
frontier war broke out, state governments had to request the aid of
other states and the federal government, empty the public
storehouses of guns for the frontier, and seek to purchase ever more
arms.20'
Such experiences persuaded the state governments that they
could not possibly arm their militia without federal help. The Militia
Act had not clarified the most important questions: Where would the
states acquire guns and who would pay for them? Maryland took the
unique path of allowing its militia system to collapse in hopes of
forcing the federal government to do something.2 2
Henry Knox thought he had the solution in his effort to
federalize arms production. In 1794 Knox reported to Congress on
the condition of the American militia.23 By Knox's estimate, the
nation could field 450,000 militia members, of whom no more than
100,000 either owned or could be supplied with guns .2 1  The
remaining 350,000 muskets, plus replacements for unusable weapons
among the remaining 100,000, could not be bought in Europe, given
the war there, even if the United States could afford such a
purchase. 205  Nor could American gunmakers hope to supply more
197. See Letter from Governor Moultrie to the House of Representatives (Nov. 30, 1792), in
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 285.
198. See Journal of the House of Representatives (Dec. 17, 1793), in JOURNALS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 421-22.
199. See Journal of the House of Representatives (Dec. 30, 1792), in JOURNALS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 233.
200. See Journal of the House of Representatives (Dec. 6, 1793), in JOURNALS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 440.
201. See Journal of the House of Representatives (Apr. 30, 1794), in JOURNALS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1792-1794, supra note 194, at 499-500.
202. See Gordon, supra note 151, at 21-22.
203. See Letter from Henry Knox to the House of Representatives (Dec. 10, 1794), supra





than some 3,000 guns per year.2°6 Knox saw only one choice:
government arsenals. Knox stated, "The only solid resource to obtain
a supply, is the establishment of manufactories within each state."20 7
Despite initial fears of granting the central government too much
power, Congress agreed with Washington, Knox, and Hamilton on
the importance of arming the militia and army.2°8 If war broke out
against a European power, the United States would be in no position
to offer an adequate defense, and it could no longer expect to receive
arms from France, as it had during the American Revolution.
America had to create domestic sources of firearms. Congress
therefore appropriated the funds to purchase 14,000 muskets and to
build three armories to make firearms.209 The first of these national
armories was built in Springfield, Massachusetts, and the second at
Harpers Ferry, Virginia-the third was never built.210 The United
States government was now in the gunmaking business, an enterprise
it would dominate and direct through the 1860s.211
Congress knew that American gunmakers could not collectively
produce the 14,000 arms they hoped to buy. 212 They did seek to
confine the market by forbidding the export of American-made arms,
the idea being that the government needed all the guns produced in
the United States-not that there was any market for the more
expensive and inferior American-made guns outside the United
States.2 13  In return for that limitation on production, Congress
indicated its willingness to buy whatever American gunsmiths could
make. 21 4 Based on Hamilton's and Knox's estimates of maximum
production, they expected that production level to be 7,000 muskets
in two years.215 To meet the shortfall, Congress appropriated $100,000
to buy British firearms and awarded the British firm of Ketland a
contract to make the locks for the American-made muskets and rifles,
a trade they maintained until 1812.216 Thus, the United States's first
206. See id.
207. Id. at 70.
208. See CRESS, supra note 17, at 75-93.
209. See MERRITr ROE SMITH, HARPERS FERRY ARMORY AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY:
THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 24-51 (1977).
210. See id.
211. See RAPHAEL P. THIAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1901, at 569-72 (1901).
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large purchase of firearms after the winning of independence came
from England, and American gunmakers could only hope to reach
the modest target of 3,500 guns per year by being supplied with
English-made locks.217
Nonetheless, American gunmakers did not reach their target of
3,500 firearms per year.218 As delays persisted, the new Secretary of
War, Timothy Pickering, admitted that buying American-made guns
was not only more expensive, but also less efficient.219 Regardless, he
insisted to the Senate that the long-term advantages of patronizing
American gunmakers far outweighed the disadvantages, especially as
these gunmakers would certainly go out of business without
government contracts. 220  On Washington's orders, Pickering sub-
sidized domestic production by ordering an additional 9,000 muskets
"after the model of the French arms, which compose, by far, the
greatest part of those in our magazines. '221 He issued further interest-
free advances and distributed English gunlocks even though the
previous orders had not yet been met.222 They were all in serious
denial. 223
The government had better luck with its own armories.
Nonetheless, high levels of government support did not translate into
satisfactory production levels. Springfield Armory, which aimed to
produce 4,200 muskets per year between 1795 and 1799,
manufactured 7,750 in its first five years-thirty-seven percent of its
goal.224 In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Springfield
Armory averaged just over five thousand guns of all kinds per year.225
Harpers Ferry could not meet that standard.2 6 As Merrit Roe Smith
has written, "[p]roductivity at Harpers Ferry between 1801 and 1806
revealed few signs of growth," with an annual output of 1,700 arms a
217. See id. at 19-24. For more information about gun production during this time period,
see JAMES A. HUSTON, LOGISTICS OF LIBERTY: AMERICAN SERVICES OF SUPPLY IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND AFTER 312-14 (1991); 1 GEORGE D. MOLLER, AMERICAN
MILITARY SHOULDER ARMS, 1784-1877, at 26-27 (1988).
218. See Timothy Pickering, Secretary of War, Address to the Senate (Dec. 12, 1795), in 1
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President Thomas Jefferson, driven by his agrarian fantasies,
initially hoped to find evidence that he could avoid the expense of
supporting arms production. In 1803, with the intention of
demonstrating that the American militia owned sufficient firearms, he
instructed Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to conduct a careful
census of firearms in America. The results disappointed Jefferson. In
a country with 524,086 official militiamen, Dearborn found 183,070
muskets; 39,648 rifles; and 13,113 other firearms, for a total of 235,831
guns (there were also 11,882 sabers). That was enough guns for forty-
five percent of the militia, one quarter of the white male population,
and just 4.9 percent of the nation's total population.22 Half of these
guns were in the hands of the federal government, with about one-
quarter in state arsenals. Dearborn's study was much more thorough
than Henry Knox's 1793 effort, and was disturbing enough for
Dearborn to make an additional meticulous count of all federal
firearms in 1806 that validated his earlier findings.229  Dearborn
concluded that if the United States continued to rely on the militia for
its defense, and if the people would not arm themselves, then the
federal government would have to do so.
On this point at least, Jeffersonians and Federalists agreed.
Though they disputed who in the militia should get the arms-the
Federalists calling for a select militia-they did not question that the
militia needed guns. Dearborn's numbers convinced a unified
Congress to pass the 1808 Militia Act, the single most important piece
of legislation promoting the development of a domestic gun
industry.230 This Act appropriated $200,000 a year "for the purpose of
providing arms and military equipment for the whole body of the
militia of the United States, either by purchase or manufacture. '231
The Act further authorized the president to erect arsenals and arms
227. SMITH, supra note 209, at 69.
228. The calculations are based on: Henry Dearborn, Return of the Militia (Dec. 29, 1802),
in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 159, 162; Henry
Dearborn, Return of the Militia (Apr. 4, 1806), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 199, 200-203; Henry Dearborn, Return of the Militia (Feb. 7, 1807),
in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 210, 214; Letter from
Henry Foxall to the Secretary of War (Aug. 1807), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 215, 217.
229. See sources cited supra note 228.
230. See See ANNALS OF CONG., 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 1002-05, 1019-45 (1807), ANNALS OF
CONG., 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 2175-97 (1808).
231. Act of Apr. 23, 1808, ch. 55, § 1, 2 Stat. 490, 490.
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manufactories "as he may deem expedient. '23 2  "All the arms
procured in virtue of this act, shall be transmitted to the several
states.., in proportion to the number of the effective militia in each
state and territory." 233
Over the next thirty years the federal government supervised
several more censuses of firearms, an enterprise in keeping with the
traditional English assize of arms. In addition, most states conducted
similar surveys into the 1840s. Collectively, these censuses reveal a
slow increase in the total number of arms available in the United
States, though it would take the Civil War to finally provide arms
sufficient for those men expected to serve in the militia.2 34 What is
most intriguing about this process is that there seems to be no
evidence of any objection to these censuses in any newspaper,
journal, or legislative record. It would appear that the people of the
United States did not question the right of their government to
determine the number, condition, and location of firearms, even in
private households. In the South, this governmental power bordered
on a necessity, in light of the constant fear of slave uprisings.
Even Thomas Jefferson, the supposed champion of individual
and states' rights, sought during his presidency to increase federal
control over the militia and arms production. Seven of Jefferson's
eight annual messages to Congress called for greater federal
regulation of the militia.235  His republican colleagues in Congress
shared his concern. The government armories at Springfield and
Harpers Ferry were doing fairly well, producing between five and ten
232. Id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 490.
233. Id. § 3, 2 Stat. at 490.
234. See Michael Bellesiles, The Origins of American Gun Culture, 1760-1865, 83 J. AM.
HIST. 425, 425-55 (1996).
235. See Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1
THE ADDRESSES AND MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 177,
at 317; Thomas Jefferson, Second Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 15, 1802), in 1
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at 333; Thomas Jefferson, Fourth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 8, 1804), in 1 THE
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thousand guns every year between them.236  But that was barely
enough to keep the army in working firearms. 23 7 Congress hoped that
a concerted effort by the federal government to arm the militia would
encourage gunmakers to expand their operations. Jefferson
appointed Tench Coxe, purveyor of public supplies, to handle the
procurements. In June 1808, Coxe took the unusual step of placing
advertisements in most of the major newspapers in the country,
calling for bids.238 Over the next five months, Coxe signed contracts
with all but one of the gunmakers who replied to his advertisement
(because his shop was too small).239 These nineteen gunmakers
agreed to deliver a total of 82,200 muskets over the next five years.24
The single largest contract was for 10,000 muskets with
Pennsylvania's Henry family, in their third generation of
gunmaking.2 41 The government advanced nearly $100,000 to aid these
gunmakers, not a single one of whom met their schedules. After two
years, by which time 17,000 muskets were due, only 3,000 had been
delivered. By the end of 1813, the government was to have spent one
million dollars and acquired at least 85,000 muskets; it had spent half
that amount and received 34,477 guns: only forty percent. Several
gunmakers wanted to give up and get out of their contracts; even the
Henry family bailed out after delivering just 4,246 guns. The new
commissary general of purchases, Callender Irvine, willingly agreed
to terminate all these contracts, especially after his inspection
convinced him that the guns delivered had little value beyond what
they would fetch as scrap.242
236. See SMITH, supra note 209, at 342-47.
237. See id.
238. See Callender Irvine, Return of Muskets Delivered Under Contracts Made for the War
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AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 624, 624-25; Arms Delivered
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Armories (Feb. 24, 1818), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10,
at 677, 677-80; Contracts Made in the Year 1818 (Feb. 25, 1819), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
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In short, gun production outside of the two national armories
continued to be a matter of small-scale operations. Tench Coxe's
report of American manufacturers in May 1813 listed a total of 148
gunmakers in eleven states-l5 of them in Pennsylvania. 2 3  He
placed the total value of these enterprises at $593,993; an average
capitalization of $5,165, but a mean of just over $1,000. 24 Coxe did
not discuss the manufacturing capabilities of America's gunmakers,
even though there was a war. Instead, the poor quality of these guns
captured his attention, leading him to suggest that it was about time
for the government to establish adequate testing facilities.
24 1
At the very time that many Jeffersonians began questioning the
capacity and ability of American gunmakers, others started
wondering whether Washington had not in fact been right about the
militia. In 1809, Connecticut's Benjamin Tallmadge, a member of the
House of Representative's Committee on the Militia, issued the usual
insistence on the value of the militia.246  In response, General
Ebenezar Huntington, a Revolutionary War veteran and past
commander of the Connecticut militia, stated roughly that "as soldiers
[the militia] are not worth their rations. ' 247 He did not believe that
the government should waste its time arming the militia, as it did not
take care of its arms, which were soon "destroyed with rust," and "I
have no doubt might be considered a total loss in five years." 248
Huntington returned to Knox's older idea of volunteer units, smaller
and better trained, and committed to taking care of their arms.
249
Without such reform, the militia would be little better than "food for
powder on the day of battle."250
Republicans came to realize that their ideology of a well-armed
universal militia had no relation to reality. National survival had to
take precedence over ideological purity. Maximillian Godefroy, a
French veteran living in Maryland, published a pamphlet in 1807
243. See Digest of Manufactures, General Exhibit: Iron Works, and Manufactures of Iron
and Steel in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FINANCE 667, 696 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew Clarke
eds., 1832).
244. See id.
245. See Digest of Manufactures, Cannon and Musket, 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FINANCE, supra note 243, at 687.
246. See Letter from Benjamin Tallmadge to General E. Huntington (Dec. 18, 1809), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 263.
247. Letter from General E. Huntington to Benjamin Tallmadge (Jan. 5, 1810), in 1






arguing that the American resistance to all military skills, from
shooting to marching, left the country no alternative but to turn to a
professional army.21 In America, Godefroy wrote, "military talents
are repulsed, and military ideas rejected as useless." '252 While Europe
was developing a whole range of new military techniques, the United
States clung to vain hopes that the militia would somehow save the
nation. Many in Congress agreed with Representative Harmanus
Bleeker of New York that "the militiaman is best employed at his
plough."253
The most ardent Republicans came to understand that the militia
needed guns in order to learn how to use them. In state after state,
officials complained that they were not yet receiving the free arms
promised under the 1808 Militia Act.254 In 1809, Joseph Bloomfield of
New Jersey began an angry letter to Congress by quoting the
Constitution as requiring Congress to arm the militia.255 He then
added pointedly, "They have not done it. The National Legislature
have neglected what they ought have done the moment it was in their
power" to arm the militia2S6 He lambasted the idiocy of expecting
individuals to arm themselves, a highly unlikely prospect. 257 In no
state, Bloomfield declared, had even one-sixth of the militia
succeeded in arming itself appropriately. 258 He lay the responsibility
for the nation's undefended condition squarely on Congress, which
shirked its most fundamental duty.25 9
The federal government could only do so much to overcome two
centuries of reliance on Europe for firearms. In 1810, Secretary of
the Treasury Albert Gallatin issued a report on manufacturers. 260
After fifteen years of government support, Gallatin listed guns under
"manufactures of iron," which "consist principally of agricultural
implements," adding that "all of the finer species" of such work is
251. See generally MAXIMILLIAN GODEFROY, MILITARY REFLECTIONS, ON FOUR MODES
OF DEFENCE, FOR THE UNITED STATES WITH A PLAN OF DEFENCE (1807).
252. CRESS, supra note 17, at 162.
253. ANNALS OF CONG., 12th Cong., 2d Sess. 630 (1813).
254. See Letter from Joseph Bloomfield to Benjamin Tallmadge (Dec. 29, 1809), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 266.
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imported from Britain. 61 The two government arsenals reached a
peak of 19,000 muskets that year, with another 20,000 guns made by
private manufacturers nationwide-39,000 guns for a population of
7,202,014, more than one million of whom were supposed to be in the
militia (enough guns for less than four percent of the militia). 262 The
government still had a long way to go if it hoped to meet the
Constitution's mandate in Article 1, Section 8, "To provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia. '263
V. GUNS AND SLAVERY
No contemporary can be found to argue that the Second
Amendment hindered the states' authority to regulate firearms. Nor
were similar passages in state constitutions perceived as blocking such
legislation. As Carl Bogus has reminded us, slavery played a key role
in the South's understanding of the Second Amendment. 264  The
Southern militia's primary purpose was the preservation of white
supremacy. The slave patrols, whose members were drawn from the
militia rosters, handled routine policing.265 But slave insurrections
pushed the militia to its limits, demonstrating that not even the fear of
slave uprisings sufficed to motivate the majority of whites to own
guns and practice their use.266
The first great test of the Southern militia under the Constitution
came in Virginia in 1800.267 In that first year of the new century, an
African American named Gabriel rattled the South to its core with a
vivid anticipation of the danger posed to the whites. 268  Gabriel's
Rebellion also revealed a core paradox in the question of arms in the
South: the need of the state to hold guns that would be easily
accessible to the militia, but not to the slaves.269 These stored arms
became the most tempting target for any revolutionary force. Thus,
261. See id.
262. See SMITH, supra note 209, at 75, 342-43.
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
264. See generally Bogus, supra note 92.
265. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH, 1800-1861, at 72-98 (1956). See
generally H.M. HENRY, THE POLICE CONTROL OF THE SLAVE IN SOUTH CAROLINA (1914).
266. See generally Sally E. Hadden, Law Enforcement in a New Nation: Slave Patrols and
Public Authority in the Old South, 1700-1865 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University) (on file with Harvard University Library).
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Gabriel's first goal was to capture the militia arms stored in the
capital, for his forces would be armed only with swords, knives, pikes,
and what few muskets he could seize from the white planters.270
As soon as Governor James Monroe heard the rumors of the
planned uprising, he ordered all the "publick arms" 271 moved from the
capital to the penitentiary under a guard of thirteen armed
militiamen-a surprisingly small force, but all that was available at
the time.272 The problem then became how to issue some of these
arms to the militia units called up by Monroe.2 73 A general panic
spread through much of Virginia at the start of Gabriel's uprising, and
whites demanded immediate militia protection.2 14 The Suffolk militia,
short of guns, appealed to the governor for aid.2 75 Monroe promised
to supply arms, but then discovered that the state had insufficient
guns even for the 500 militiamen so far ordered into action.276 The
militia officers appealed repeatedly for aid, without success, finally
arming their troops with whatever they could lay their hands on,
primarily bladed weapons.277
Most observers felt that only heavy rains and the early discovery
of the uprising prevented a successful slave rebellion. As James
Callender wrote Thomas Jefferson, the insurrection "could hardly
have failed of success, . . . for after all, we could only muster four or
five hundred men of whom no more than thirty had Muskets. '278
Norfolk mayor Thomas Newton was delighted to hear that the militia
had been called out, but complained that "they have not arms, and
are on that account only equal to the slaves except in numbers. '279
Mayor Newton insisted that it was the state's job to see that the
militia was properly armed.280
During the slave insurrection scare of 1802, Monroe reserved
most of the state's arms for the Nineteenth Regiment of Richmond,
charged with protecting the capital. 281 That unit was fully armed with
270. See id. at 55-56.
271. Id. at 72.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 75-79.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 77.
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"four hundred and twelve stands of public Arms. '282 Monroe felt that
he had learned his lesson from Gabriel's Rebellion, and that with the
vast majority of his citizens "unarmed ... they may become a prey to
a very small force. '283 He therefore sought to ensure that the slave
patrols were better armed and far more intrusive.284 The terror
aroused in the white breast by Gabriel's Rebellion saw an increase in
interest in the militia across the South.2 85
The Southern governments responded to their fear of slave
insurrection by shifting more funds to arming their militia and by
insuring that there was no individual right to bear arms.286 It seems
almost too obvious to point out that the Second Amendment did
nothing to prevent the various states from disarming those perceived
as dangerous to public safety and passing laws forbidding the
possession of guns by these people. Thus every Southern state not
only forbade slaves from carrying firearms, but also outlawed the
ownership of guns by free blacks. 287 The only challenge to this
legislation came in 1844. The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that laws restricting the use of firearms by free blacks
did not violate the Second Amendment.288
VI. MADISON'S LESSON
Under the leadership of James Madison, the United States
entered the War of 1812 grotesquely unprepared for a sustained
conflict. Jefferson had allowed the United States Army's total
strength to fall to 2,400 men in 1807.289 As the war approached,
MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION OF JAMES MONROE'S PAPERS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS AND
OF PHOTOSTATS OF RELATED PAPERS (on file with Virginia State Library).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See EGERTON, supra note 267, at 133-34.
285. See id. at 173.
286. See, e.g., On the Claim of South Carolina for Payment for the Services of the Militia of
that State in the War of 1812-1815 (Jan. 11, 1830), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 219, 219-20; Letters from Governor Alston to Colonel Drayton and
General Pinckney, in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 224,
224-31; On Claim of South Carolina for Reimbursement of Money Paid for the Support of the
Militia of that State During the War of 1812-1815 (Dec. 15, 1831), in 4 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 769, 769-80.
287. See, e.g., DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 24-29 (1991); THEODORE B. WILSON, THE
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288. See State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844).
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Congress authorized an army of 10,000, but recruiters had little luck
finding that many men in America willing to serve.29° When Congress
declared war in June, the U.S. Army consisted of 6,750 men.291
Wellington commanded about 46,000 men at the Battle of Salamanca
the next month, while Napoleon led an army of 450,000 into Poland.192
William King, the Assistant Inspector General of the U.S. Army,
found the vast majority of federal arms "in infamously bad order." 93
Matters were much worse among the militia. In his preliminary war
message, President Madison called upon "the several states, to take
effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according to law,"
their militia.2 94 They were in desperate need of help, with nearly
every militia in the country appealing for arms and ammunition.2 95
Pennsylvania's adjutant general reported that his state's 99,414 men
could take the field with 30,366 guns, both publicly and privately
owned.2 96 In July 1813, the House Committee of Military Affairs
stated a transparent truth: "[T]he war found the militia badly
armed. '297  General William Lenoir informed North Carolina's
governor that "a considerable part of the 7,000 militiamen" who
reported for service were "unarmed. 2 98 He had no idea "how they
are to be furnished with arms. '299 The situation was worse in
Vermont, Rhode Island, and New York.3°° The latter state's Senator
Obadiah German felt that "the evils attending upon calling a large
portion of the militia into actual service for any considerable time, is
almost incalculable. '" 301 He correctly prophesied that the event "will
teach you the impropriety of relying on them for carrying on the
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See R. ERNEST DuPuY & TREVOR N. Dupuy, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY
HISTORY FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 756, 765 (1986).
293. Inspector's Report on the State of the Fourteenth Regiment of Infantry, Commanded
by Colonel William H. Winder, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra
note 10, at 491, 492.
294. Letter from Caleb Strong to W. Eustis (Aug. 5, 1812), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 323, 323.
295. See Letter from W.C.C. Claiborne to Louisiana Senators and Congressmen (May 19,
1813), in 6 OFFICIAL LETrER BOOKS OF W.C.C. CLAIBORNE, 1801-1816, at 218, 218-19
(Dunbar Rowland ed., 1917).
296. See Pennsylvania Militia, WEEKLY REGISTER, Dec. 12, 1812, at 240.
297. Arming the Militia, Communicated to the House of Representatives (July 8, 1813), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 337, 338.
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299. Id.
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war."302 The historian Lawrence Delbert Cress has offered a more
biting conclusion: "Ironically, the ideological tenets that had informed
Republican critiques of Federalist policy over the previous decade
would render the republic in the years preceding the War of 1812
virtually defenseless-this despite a clearly discernible sense that the
nation's peacetime forces required significant reform."3 3
The federal government did its best to make up for its previous
complacency, rushing to supply modern, usable muskets to the army,
and any kind of guns to the militia. The War Department gave
priority to those militia it thought most likely to see battle, sending
5,000 muskets to Connecticut, 2,000 to New York, and 1,500 to
Louisiana in the first year of the war.1 4 Repeatedly, militia officers
reported that many of those receiving firearms appeared to have
never handled one before.3 5
The concerns of the War Department were well founded, for
when the British did attack Washington, D.C. in August 1814, the
militia crumbled. The British expeditionary force was tiny by
European standards, a mixed force of 4,370 infantry, marines, and
sailors, with just three artillery pieces.3 6 In theory, they faced an
aroused populace able to field some 50,000 militia within a day's
march of the capital. There were certainly enough registered
members of the militia, but they had rarely mustered, let alone
trained, and most were unarmed. 30 7 The Virginia militia had no
supply of flints, a necessity for actually firing a gun, while the
governor of Pennsylvania could not call out the militia to protect
Washington because the legislature had failed to pass a new militia
law.30 8 Those who did show up did everything wrong; even reversing
the famous mythology by forming themselves into neat ranks in open
fields while the British fired at them from behind the cover of trees. °9
Admiral Alexander Cochrane's forces easily defeated the nearly
12,000 United States militia men he encountered, including General
302. Id.
303. CRESS, supra note 17, at 152.
304. See Arming the Militia, Communicated to the House of Representatives (July 8, 1813),
supra note 297, at 337.
305. See, e.g., JOHN BRANNAN, OFFICIAL LETTERS OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL
OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES 103, 109 (1971).
306. See ELTING, supra note 289, at 207.
307. See id.
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CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON 44-45 (1849).
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John Stricker's beautifully uniformed Baltimore regiment of 3,000
men.310 Thousands of Americans quietly slipped away for home
without ever firing a shot in defense of their nation's liberty.311 It was
a sorry show, as smoke rose from the burning White House, and
British sailors cavorted in the Capitol.
Many contemporaries thought the local militia units simply
cowardly, but at least one regiment had a sound reason for not acting
in defense of the capital city: they had almost no guns. Colonel
George Minor testified before Richard M. Johnson's House
committee investigating the fall of Washington, D.C. in October 1814.
Minor, in command of Virginia's Sixtieth Regiment, arrived at
Washington, D.C. with 600 infantry and 100 cavalry.312 He found his
troops grievously short of arms, reporting personally to President
Madison "as to the want of arms, ammunition &c. '3 13 Madison sent
him to General Armstrong, who told him that
arms, &c. could not be had that night, and directed me to report
myself next morning to Colonel Carbery, who would furnish me
with arms, &c.; which gentleman, From early next morning, I
diligently sought for, until a late hour in the forenoon, without
being able to find him, and then went in search of General
Winder.3
14
He found Winder and was told to wait.31' As a consequence, this
regiment, described by General Winder as "wholly unarmed," never
saw battle.316 As his capital burned, President Madison may have
reflected on the failure of the federal government to successfully arm
its citizens.
But few people in this first generation of constitutional
government questioned the federal government's inherent authority
to regulate and arm the militia. The Supreme Court cast aside the old
Antifederalist position in Houston v. Moore317 and Martin v. Mott.'18
Both decisions upheld the clearest reading of Article 1, Section 8 on
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See Arming the Militia, Communicated to the House of Representatives (July 8, 1813),
supra note 297, at 337.
313. Narrative of General Winder (Sept. 26, 1814), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MILITARY AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 552, 554.
314. Colonel George Minor's Statement, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY
AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 568, 569.
315. See id.
316. Narrative of General Winder (Sept. 26, 1814), supra note 313, at 554.
317. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
318. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
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the Constitution as granting the federal government complete control
over the militia. Justice Joseph Story quoted the Second Amendment
in Houston v. Moore to demonstrate the need for Congress to
regulate the militia.3 9  Justice Story wrote, "[A] rational inter-
pretation, must construe this power as exclusive in its own nature, and
belonging solely to Congress. 3 20 Any law such as Pennsylvania's that
granted the state more authority over the militia when in national
service would be disruptive and "repugnant to the constitutional
laws" already passed by Congress. 321 In Martin v. Mott, Justice Story
held that Congress, as representative of the people, could be counted
on to "guard against usurpation or wanton tyranny. ' 322 The Second
Amendment was read entirely within this context of the government's
need to regulate the militia. There was no dissent in either case.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures, whether local or national, worked on the
assumption that they had a legitimate interest in passing acts to
secure the public safety. As a consequence, measures that placed
precise limitations on the use and possession of firearms passed
largely unchallenged. On the one occasion when such legislation was
overturned, in Bliss v. Commonwealth,3 23 the Kentucky Supreme
Court ruled that state regulation of firearms violated the state's
militia amendment, which granted an explicitly individual right to
bear arms.324 In response, the legislature immediately amended the
state constitution to allow such legislation, rewriting the militia
amendment to more closely match the federal Constitution's Second
Amendment. 325 Otherwise, court after court agreed with the logic of
Tennessee's high court in Aymette v. State3 26 that "[t]he object, then,
for which the right of keeping and bearing arms is secured, is the
defence of the public3 27 and that nothing in the Constitution limits
319. Justice Story called it the Fifth Amendment in the opinion. See Houston, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) at 52.
320. Id. at 54.
321. Id. at 76.
322. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 19.
323 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
324. See id.
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the legislature "from passing laws regulating the manner in which
these arms may be employed."3 28
Such decisions validated a wide variety of gun regulations at the
state and federal levels. Congress retained tight control over the sale
of firearms and ammunition to the Indians, again needing no further
justification than public safety. The Indian Intercourse Act of 1834
placed strict limitations on those selling any kind of arms to Indians
and required a federal license to enter into the Indian trade.3 29 States
worked to keep firearms out of the hands of those persons marked as
unsafe, including blacks. 30 And as always, political enemies had no
right to bear arms. The new U.S. government and several state
governments made that abundantly clear in a number of uprisings in
the early national period, from the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794
through Dorr's Rebellion in 1842, as well as anything approximating a
slave uprising.331
Several states responded to the threat of concealed weapons.
Not just pistols, but a variety of small, well-made bladed weapons like
dirks and Bowie knives, as well as sword canes, could too easily be
concealed and produced in the midst of an argument, to lethal effect.
As the early American political scholar Benjamin Oliver wrote in
1832, the "cowardly and disgraceful" act of carrying concealed
weapons transformed what might have been a barroom brawl into a
deadly encounter.33 2 The Second Amendment, which Oliver held
relevant only to the militia system, offered nothing "to prevent
congress or the legislatures of the different states from enacting laws
to prevent citizens from always going armed." '333 Most state legislators
agreed with Oliver's interpretation. As early as 1801, the Tennessee
legislature made it illegal for anyone to "publicly ride or go armed to
the terror of the people, or privately carry any dirk, large knife, pistol,
or any other dangerous weapon, to the fear or terror of any
person. 3 34 Louisiana's 1813 act outlawing the carrying of concealed
328. Id. at 159; see also State v. Reid, I Ala. 612, 616 (1840) (declaring that neither the
federal nor state constitutions "expressly nor by implication, denied to the Legislature, the right
to enact laws in regard to the manner in which arms shall be borne").
329. See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730.
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firearms allowed police officers to stop and search anyone suspected
of carrying a concealed weapon.335 Several state constitutions forbade
noncitizens from possessing firearms.3 6  This fear of concealed
weapons accelerated in the 1830s as pistols became smaller. In 1832
Illinois instituted a $100 fine for anyone caught carrying "upon him
any pistol, gun, knife, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon. 337
Ohio's fine was $200.338 In 1837, Georgia's legislature forbade
shopkeepers from selling or even stocking pistols and concealable
bladed weapons.339 The Georgia Supreme Court later declared this
statute unconstitutional in that it prohibited the carrying of weapons,
but constitutional in its prescription of how they were carried' °
Repeatedly, individuals directly involved in the ratification of the
Second Amendment voted unhesitatingly to limit the rights of gun
ownership. If one believes that actions reveal more of intentions than
abstract language, then it is difficult to mistake the initial legal and
political understanding of the Second Amendment. But maybe this is
all irrelevant. Perhaps-and here is the second reason for ignoring
this research-the original intention of the framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights should not enter into our civic
deliberations. After all, as Jack Rakove convincingly established, the
original meaning of the framers was that future generations should
not be guided by eighteenth-century events and ideas.341 But that is
not to negate the value of historical knowledge. I offer the modest
suggestion that the historical context of a constitutional amendment is
relevant, though not determinative, of its meaning. Any study of the
historical context of the Constitution and Bill of Rights cannot escape
the fact that they were drafted in the midst of a long-term perceived
militia crisis. In the absence of police, the militia was expected to
maintain internal order, responding to insurrections, whether by
slaves or political radicals. With a feeble standing army, the
335. See MEINRAD GREINER, THE LOUISIANA DIGEST, EMBRACING THE LAWS OF THE
LEGISLATURE OF A GENERAL NATURE ENACTED FROM THE YEAR 1804 TO 1841, at 131
(1841).
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leadership of the United States hoped that the militia could protect
the nation's security. But the militia could do neither. In a time of
insecurity and uncertainty, the political leadership throughout the
United States turned to the federal government to, as Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution states, "provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia. 3 42 The Second Amendment confirmed
that commitment to organize and arm the militia. When they said
that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state,
they meant it.
342. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
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